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NOTES

NOTES
THE MUTUALITY REQUIREMENT IN
RES JUDICATA AND ESTOPPEL BY RECORD

The terms "res judicata," "estoppel by judgment," and "estoppel
by record" are used indiscriminately by the courts to describe the
effect of a prior court adjudication upon a later arising litigation.'
It is the purpose of this note, not to distinguish between, or to criticize these terms, but to outline the extent of their application, particularly with respect to the present-day status of the so-called mutuality requirement. Consideration is necessarily narrowed to existing
judgments in full and operative effect, not reversed or otherwise set
4
aside; 2 to final judgments;3 to those rendered on the merits; to judg5
ments which are not impeachable collaterally for lack of jurisdiction
6
or fraud; and finally, to judgments in personam, since judgments
in rem, and judgments as to status, are considered binding on all the
world, 7 and thus present no problem in the extent of application.
The general statement is that such a personal judgment or decree
is conclusive of the rights of the parties thereto, or their privies in all
other judicial tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and
matters in issue and adjudicated in the first suit.8 A party is defined
2Millar, The Premises of the Judgment as Res Judicata in Continental and
Anglo-American Law (194o) 39 Mich. L. 238, 253; Note (1934) 88 A. L. R. 574.
2Reed v. Allen, 286 U. S. 191, 199, 52 S. Ct. 532, 533-534, 76 L. ed. 1054 (1932); E.
I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Richmond Guano Co., 297 Fed. 580 (C. C. A. 4th
1924); Hall v. Wilder Mfg. CO., 316 Mo. 812, 293 S. W. 760 (1927), 52 A. L. R. 723
(1928); 3o Am. Jur. 950; 15 R. C. L. 953.
3Rudd v. Cornell, 171 N. Y. 114, 127, 63 N. E. 823, 827 (1902); Burner v. Hevener,
34 W. Va. 774, 12 S. E. 861 (1891); 2 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925) § 717; 1 Green-

leaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) § 529.
'Swift v. McPherson, 232 U. S. 51, 34 S. Ct. 239, 58 L. ed. 499 (1914); Clegg v.
U.S., 112 F. (2d) 886 (C. C. A. ioth, 1940); Bulau v. Bulau, 294 N. W. 845, 847 (Minn.
1940); Garrett v. Greenwell, 92 Mo. 120, 4 S. W. 441 (1887); Payne v. Grant, 81 Va.
164 (1885); Peterson v. Morris, 19 Wash. 335, 205 Pac. 408 (1922); 2 Freeman, Judgments (5 th ed. 1925) § 723 et seq.; i Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) § 530; 30 Am.
Jur. 944-948; 34 C. J. 774; 15 R. C. L. 955rArizona Commercial Mining Co. v. Iron Cap Copper Co., 119 Me. 213, 11o Atl.
429 (1920); 2 Freeman, Judgments ( 5 th ed. 1925) § 733; 30 Am. Jur. 940-1; 34 C. J.
768; 15 R. C. L. 957.
eKing v. Emmons, 283 Mich. 116, 277 N. W. 85i, 115 A. L. R. 564 (1938); 2 Freeman, Judgments (5 th ed. 1925) § 731; 3o Am. Jur. 941; 34 C. J. 769.
7iGreenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) § 525; Cox, Res. Judicata: Who Entitled to
Plead (1923) 9 Va. L. Reg. 241, 245; 15 R. C. L. ioo8.
8Southern Pacific R. Co. v. U. S., 168 U. S. 1, 48, 18 S. Ct. 18, 27, 42 L. ed. 355
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as one who is directly interested in the subject matter and who has
a right to control the proceedings, to make defense, to adduce and
cross-examine witnesses, and to appeal from the decision if any appeal lies.9 Privity denotes mutual or successive relationship to the same
rights of property. 1 The reasons given for this general principle are:
that persons should not be vexed by endless litigation," that the
dignity and respect of judicial proceedings must be upheld, 12 and
that there is a public interest in peace and order and in preventing
3
unnecessary and expensive litigation.'
The simplest illustration of the doctrine appears when the second
suit is identical with the first-i.e., brought between the same parties
or their privies, in the same capacity,' 4 on the same cause of action.
The second suit is precluded by the adjudication in the first. In this
case, however, the prior judgment is said to constitute a bar concluding the parties and their privies, not only as to matter actually offered
(1897); Parker v. U. S., 114 F. (2d) 330 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940); Virginia Ry. & Power Co.
v. Leland, 143 Va. 920, 129 S. E. 700 (1925); 2 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925)
§ 627; 15 R. C. L. 950; 3o Am. Jur. 9o8.
OBigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U. S. 111, 126, 32 S. Ct. 641, 642, 56

L. ed. ioog (1912); Robbins v. Chicago City, 4 Wall. 657, 672, 18 L. ed. 427 (U. S.
1866); 1 Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) § 535; 15 R. C. L. lOog. A person not a
party, however, can be bound by a judgment by virtue of interest in the result of litigation, and by active participation therein. Universal Oil Products Co. v. WinklerKoch Engineering Co., 27 F. Supp. 161 (N. D. 111. 1939); Keith v. Willers Truck
Service, 64 S. D. 274, 266 N. W. 256, 104 A. L. R. 1471 (1936); State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co. v. Wright, 173 Va. 261, 3 S. E. (2d) 187 (1939); 2 Freeman, Judgments ( 5 th
ed. 1925) § 430; 15 R. C. L. oo9-10.
"Litchfield v. Goodnow's Adm'r., 123 U. S. 549, 8 S. Ct. 210, 31 L. ed. 199 (1887).
Privity is classified as being in estate-for example, joint tenancy, donor-donee, lessor-lessee; blood-for example, successor in title by descent; representation-for example, executor-testator; and in law-for example, personal representative-decedent. i Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) §§ 523, 536; Riddle v. Cella, 128 N. J.
Eq. 4, 15 A. (2d) 59 (1940); 1 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925) § 438; 3o Am. Jur.
957-8; 15 R. C. L. 1015-6.
uWilliams v. Daisey, 7 Harr. 142, 18o Atl. 9o8 (Del. 1935); 3o Am. Jur. 9 1; 15 R.

C. L. 954.
"Southern Pacific R. Co. v. U. S., 168 U. S. 1, 49, 18 S. Ct. 18, 27, 42 L. ed 355
(1897); State Hospital v. Consolidated Water Supply Co., 267 Penn. 29, 1 1o Atl. 281
(1920); 3o Am. Jur. 9i;
15 R. C. L. 955'2Baldwin v. Iowa State Travelling Men's Association, 283 U. S. 522, 525, 51 S. Ct.
517, 518, 75 L. ed. 1244 (1931); Bennett v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 113
F. (2d) 837 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1940); Moschizsker, Res Judicata (1929) 38 Yale L. J. 299,

300; 34 C. J. 743.
1
Bamka v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. R. Co., 61 Minn. 549, 63 N. W. 1116, 52 Am.
St. Rep. 618 (1895); Miller v. Stieglitz, 113 N. J. L. 40, 172 Atl. 57, 59 934); Gibson v.
Solomon, 136 Ohio St. 101, 23 N. E. (2d) 996 (1939); Keith v. Willers Truck Service,
6 4 S. D. 274, 266 N. W. 256, 104 A. L. R. 1471 (1936); 15 R. C. L. 1012.
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to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter that might have been offered for that purpose. 15 Thus,
where A sues B in tort for a personal injury caused by several acts of
negligence, A must aver all grounds for recovery, and any judgment
secured in the first suit bars subsequent actions for the same injury although other grounds are averred in the second suit.16 The principle
applied in this manner, and in this manner only, is the true form of
res judicata.17 We are not further concerned with it in this note.
The extent of the principle is varied somewhat when the second
suit is again between the same parties, or their privies, but the cause
of action is not the same, although issues adjudicated in the first suit
are incidentally involved in the second. Here the same reasons for
holding the parties precluded by findings in the prior suit apply, but
the rule differs to the extent that only matter that has been actually
adjudicated is conclusive against the parties.'s It is thus necessary,
in the second suit, to determine what issues were actually litigated and
determined in the first.19 Although an infallible standard is difficult to
formulate, it is said that the former adjudication is conclusive only
"Baltimore Steamship Co. v. Phillips, 274 U. S. 316, 319, 47 S. Ct. 6oo, 602, 71 L.
ed. 1069 (1927); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 352, 24 L. ed. 195 (1876);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Commissioners of Hamilton County, 117 Fed. 82 (C.
C. A. 8th, 19o2); Luce v. N. Y., Chicago & St. Louis Ry., 213 App. Div. 374, 21x N. Y.
Supp. 184 (1925). As to whether the cause of action is the same, the best test is
said to depend on whether the facts or proofs submitted to sustain each are the
same. Jackson v. Pepper Gasoline Co., 28'4 Ky. 175, 144 S. W. (2d) 212, 214 (1940);
Williams v. Messick, t77 Md. 6o5, ii A. (2d) 472, 129 A. L. R. 1035 (1940); 2 Freeman,
Judgments (5th ed. 1925) § 687; 15 R. C. L. 964-5.
-"Columb v. Webster Mfg. Co., 84 Fed. 592 (C. C. A. 1st, 1898); Trayhern v. Colburn, 66 Md. 277, 7 At. 459 (1886); 2 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. i 9 25 ) § 682.
'Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Rison, 99 Va. 18, 34, 37 S. E. 32o, 325 (1900). The
doctrine is frequently referred to as "estoppel." See Blue Valley Creamery Co. v.
Cornimus, 27o Ky. 496, 110 S. W. (2d) 286 (1937); 2 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed.
1925) § 676; 30 Am. Jur. 912. Professor Millar, writing in recent articles, notes that
this is not really a form of the common law estoppel but has its roots in early Roman law. Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata (1940)
35 Ill. L. Rev. 41, 56. Also see Millar, The Premises of the Judgment as Res Juaicata
in Continental and Anglo-American Law (1940) 39 Mich. L. Rev. 238, 253.
"Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 353, 24 L. ed. 195 (1876); Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Board of Commissioners of Hamilton County, 117 Fed. 82 (C. C. A. 8th,
1902); Harding v. Harding, 352 Ill. 417, 186 N. E. 152 (1933), 88 A. L. R. 563 (1934);
Bulau v. Bulau, 294 N. W. 845, 847 (Minn. 1940); Miller v. Stieglitz, 113 N. J. L. 40,
172 At. 57 (1934); Brunner v. Cook, 134 Va. 266, 114 S. E. 650 (1922); 2 Freeman,
Judgments (5th ed. 1925) § 677; 3o Am. Jur. 925; 15 R. C. L. 652. See Note (1936)
104 A. L. R. 978.
nRussell v. Place, 94 U. S. 6o6 (1876); Capps v. Whitson, 157 Va. 46, 16o S. E.
71 (1931); 1 Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) § 532; 15 R. C. L. 952.
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as to facts directly and distinctly put in issue and the finding of which
is necessary to uphold the judgment, and also matters which follow
by necessary and inevitable inference from an adjudication, ° This application of the general doctrine is not historically res judicata, but
estoppel. 21 It is often loosely referred to as "res judicata," and as
"estoppel by judgment." It is not the judgment alone, however, but
22
the record, as terminated by the judgment, which creates the estoppel,
and the more correct terminology would seem to be "estoppel by record."

23

A prior adjudication between the parties can be shown in two ways:
as-evidence under the general issue, and by a plea in bar.24 According
to the principles above stated, res judicata or estoppel, when pleaded in
bar, is conclusive upon the parties.2 5 Some doubt has been expressed as
to whether the former judgment is likewise conclusive when submitted
in evidence, but the weight of authority in the United States seems to
be that it is equally as conclusive in effect as if pleaded in bar,28 and
must go to the jury as a conclusive establishment of facts previously
"OWilliams v. Daisey, 7 Harr. 142 , i8o At. 9o8 (Del. 1935); Winters v. Basaillon,
153 Ore. 509, 57 P. (2d) 1095, 1o4 A. L. R. 968 (1936); McCoy v. McCoy, 29 W. Va.
794, 2 S. E. 8o9 (1887); 2 Freeman, Judgments (5 th ed. 1925) §§ 677, 689-693; 1 Greenleaf, Evidence (i6th ed. 1899) § 534; 15 R. C. L. 976-980. A careful study has been
made on this point by Professor Millar in the article, The Premises of the Judgment
as Res. Judicata in Continental and Anglo-American Law (194o) 39 Mich. L. Rev.
238. The case of Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler, 157 U. S. 683, 15 S. Ct. 733, 39 L.
ed. 859 (1895), says Millar, enlarged the rule of the "qualified" conclusiveness of the
premises which confined finality to matters in issue as set out in Cromwell v.
County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 24 L. ed. 195 (1876), to the rule of "relative" conclusiveness of the premises which allows a default judgment to conclude the parties
as to matters express or implied in the pleadings, and which is the present majority
rule. See Note (1940) 128 A. L. R. 472.
"Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata (194o)
35 Ill. L. Rev. 41, 46.
"See Spaulding v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 96 Vt. 67, 72, 117 AtI. 376, 378
(1922); Outram v. Moorewood, 3 East. 346, io2 Eng. Rep. 630 (1803); Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata (1940) 35 Ill. L. Rev. 41 , 55;
15 R. C. L. 953. Also see Millar, The Premises of the Judgment as Res Judicata in
Continental and Anglo-American Law (1940) 39 Mich. L. Rev. 238, 262 et seq.
"Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata (194o)
35 Ill. L. Rev. 41, 46, 52, 58.
241 Greenleaf, Evidence (t6th ed. 1899) § 531.
2'The theory is said to be that the prior judgment presents evidence of the facts
of so high a nature that nothing could be proved by other evidence which would be
sufficient to overcome it, and therefore the party is estopped from submitting evidence, or precluded by law from doing so: 15 R: C. L. 953-4.
"eSouthern Pacific R. Co. v. U. S., 168 U. S. i, 59-6o, 18 S. Ct. 18, 31, 42 L. ed.
355 (1897); Trayhern v. Colburn, 66 Md. 277, 7 At. 459 (1886); 1 Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) § 531. For an extensive annotation on the methods of pleading
estoppel by record, see Note (1939) 12o A. L. R. 8, 55 et seq.
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decided. For the purposes of the remainder of this note, it will be assumed that this difference in the method of presenting a former adjudication in a later case does not create varying results so far as conclusive
effect is concerned.
Whereas a judgment or decree is mutually binding on all the parties
to the proceedings and their privies, either as a bar or as conclusive
evidence, the universal rule is that strangers are not bound. 27 As a concomitant of this rule, its converse has been accepted as established lawi.e., if the person claiming the benefit of the former adjudication is
a stranger to it, and is not bound thereby, he cannot assert the judgment against one who was a former party.28 This is known as the rule
of mutuality. Stated another way, no party is bound in a subsequent
suit by a prior judgment unless the person seeking to secure the benefit of the former adjudication would have been bound by it if it had
29
been determined to other way.
Although this rule of mutuality is obviously applicable where
the same parties are again litigating, difficulty has been encountered
in finding rational support for it as an immutable principle where
third parties are concerned. It frequently operates against the policy
of the res judicata-estoppel doctrine that an end should be put to unnecessary litigation, and it has been expected to, evaded, or abolished
in many situations. As well accepted as the principle itself are the exceptions made when a party to both first and second suits is pitted
against different persons between whom exists derivative liablity. For
example, a plaintiff sues a servant for tortious acts committed by him
in the course of the master's business. The servant is primarily liable
as the wrongdoer, and the master is secondarily, or derivatively liable
by the doctrine of respondeat superior. If the plaintiff fails to recover,
the servant's acts being found not to constitute negligence, the master
is allowed the benefit of this prior adjudication as a bar to a later ac2Litchfield v. Goodnow (Litchfield v. Crane), 123 U. S. 549, 8 S. Ct. 21o, 31 L.
ed. 199 (1887); Neenan v. Woodside Astoria Transp. Co., 261 N. Y. i59, 184 N. E.
744 (1933); Rabil v. Farris, 213 N. C. 414,196 S. E. 321, 116 A. L. R. 1o83 (1938); 1
3o Am. Jur. 951 et seq.
Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925) § 407; 15 R. C. L. oOO6;
"Bigelow v. Old Dominion Cooper Co., 225 U. S. 111, 32 S. Ct. 641, 56 L. ed. oo9
(1912); Williams v. Messick, 177 Md. 605, 11 A. (2d) 472, 129 A. L. R. 1035 (1940); 1
Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925) § 428; 1 Greenlieaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) §
524; 15 R. C. L. 956.
2New York and Cuba Mail S. S. Co. v. Continental Insurance Co. of City of
New York, 32 F. Supp. 251 (S. D. N. Y., 1940); State ex rel. First Nat. Bk. v. Hastings, 120 Wash. 283, 207 Pac. 23 (1922); (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 607, 6o8; 3o Am. Jur.
951.
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tion by the same plaintiff against him on the same facts.3 0 The mutuality principle is violated, because if the plaintiff had prevailed in the
first suit against the servant, the master would not have been bound
thereby, being a stranger to that suit.3 ' Yet since the master's liability
is predicated upon the servant's negligence, and the servant has been
found free from negligence, the exception is a most rational one. It
has been uniformly followed where derivative liability exists and
where, as in the above example, the plea is used by the person secondarily liable as against a party to the prior suit who has once tried
his case against the primary wrongdoer and lost.82 Thus where the successive suits are against the agent and the principal, indemnitor and
indemnitee, and lessor and lessee, the exception is made. s3 Since in
all derivative liability cases there is a liability over from the primary
wrongdoer to the party secondarily liable if the latter is subjected to
loss by virtue of suit against him by the injured party,34 these holdings are fortified by the fact that it would be an anomalous situation
3'Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence, 158 Fed. 63 (C. C. A.
8th, 1907), 16 L. R. A. (N. s.) 677 (19o8); 1 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925) § 469.
3Emma Silver Mining Co. v. Emma Silver Mining Co. of N. Y., 7 Fed. 4ol, 4o8
(C. C. S. D. N. Y., 188o); Good Health Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery, 275 N. Y. 14,
9 N. E. (2d) 758, 760 (1937), 112 A. L. R. 401, 404 (1938); 1 Freeman, Judgments (sth
ed- 1925) § 469; 15 R. C. L. oo6-7; 3o Am. Jur. 951 et seq. If the master had participated in the first suit, he would have been bound by the adjudication. Footnote 9,
supra.
2This is obviously the case where a former judgment in favor of a principal is
used by the surety in a later case, as against a party to the former suit. Here the
surety's obligation does not arise unless the principal is liable. i Freeman, Judgments ( 5 th ed. 1925) § 466.
uHart Steel Co. v. RR. Supply Co., 244 U. S. 294, 37 S. Ct. 5o6 (1g7); New
Orleans & N. E. R. v. Jopes, 142 U. S. 18, 12 S.Ct. io 9 , 35 L. ed. 919 (1891); Portland
Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence, 158 Fed. 63 (C. C. A. 8th, 1907), 16 L. R.
A. (N. s.) 677 (19o8); Emma Silver Mining Co..v. Emma Silver Mining Co. of N. Y., 7
Fed. 401 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 188o); Triano v. Booth, t2o Cal. App. 345, 8 P. (2d) 174
(1932); Roadway Express Inc. v. McBrown, 61 Ga. App. 223, 6 S.E. (2d) 46o ('939);
Kavis v. Schimmel, 213 Ind. 518, 13 N. E. (2d) 565 (1938); Hobbs v. Illinois C. R.,
171 Iowa 624, 152 N. W. 40 (1915), L. R. A. 191 7 E, 1o3; Blue Valley Creamery Co.
v. Cronimus, 270 Ky. 496, 11o S.W. (2d) 286 (1927); Taylor v. Sartorious, 13o Mo.
App. 23, io8 S.W. 1o89 (19o8); King v. Chase, 15 N. H. 9,41 Am. Dec. 675 (1844);
Good Health Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery, 275 N."Y. 14, 9 N. E. (2d) 758 (1937),
112 A. L. R. 401 (1938); Leary v. Virginia-Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank, 215 N. C.
501, 2 S. E. (2d) 570 (1939); Doremus v. Root, 23 Wash. 71o, 63 Pac. 572 (1901), 54
L. R. A. 649 (1902). See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U. S. 111, 127-128,
32 S.Ct. 641-642, 56 L. ed. 1009 (1912).
1'Robbins v. Chicago City, 4 Wall. 657, 18 L. ed. 427 (U. S. 1866); Jentick v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 105 P. (2d) ioo5 (Cal., 1940); Betcher v. McChesney, 255
Pa. 394, 1oo Atl. 124 (1917); Richmond v. Sitterding, 1o1 Va. 354, 43 S.E. 562 (19o3),
65 L. R. A. 445 (1904); 1 Freeman, Judgments (5 th ed. 1925) § 447.
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if the party who is secondarily liable should sue the primary wrongdoer on the liability over where the primary wrongdoer has once -been
exonerated of the very same wrong in a former suit. Thus the principle has also been applied in favor of a municipality which is sued for
injuries caused by the negligent condition of streets, railways, etc.,
when the municipality has the right of recovery over against the primary wrongdoer who may be an abutting landowner, railway company,
and the like.3 5
The same exception to the mutuality rule has been made where
a suit is first brought against the party secondarily liable instead of
against the primary wrongdoer, and the judgment is against the
plaintiff. Here the person primarily liable is allowed to take advantage of the former adjudication. 36 For example, the plaintiff sues the
master for injuries caused by his servant in the course of the master's
business, and the master prevails on the ground that the servant was
not negligent. The plaintiff then sues the servant as the primary
wrongdoer for the same injuries. The servant is held to be entitled
to the benefit of the prior adjudication, although he was nota party
to it and thus could not be bound if the prior judgment had been in
favor of the plaintiff. Here it is necessary to show that the prior adjudication was upon the issue of the wrongdoer's negligence and not
upon some collateral defense available to the master alone, such as
lack of authority of the servant to do the act in question. 7 The ex35Betor v. City of Albany, 193 App. Div. 349, 184 N. Y. Supp. 44 (1920); Brobston v. Darby, 290 Pa. 331, 138 Atl. 849 (1927), 54 A. L. R. 1285 (1928); Hill v. Bain,
15 R.. 1. 75, 23 AtI. 44, 2 Am. St. Rep. 873 (1885); Town of Waynesboro v. Wiseman,
163 Va. 778, 177 S. E. 224 (1934); Sawyer v. City of Norfolk, 136 Va. 66, 116 S. E. 245
(1923); 1 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed. 1925) § 451.
3*Anderson v. West Chicago St. R., 2o0 111. 329, 65 N. E. 717 (1902); Chicago &
R. I. R. v. Hutchins, 34 Ill. io8 (1864); Atkinson v. White, 6o Me. 396 (1872); Emery
v. Fowler, 39 Me. 326, 63 Am. Dec. 627 (1855); Brown v. Wabash Ry., 222 Mo. App.
518, 281 S. W. 64 (1926); Tighe v. Skillings, 297 Mass. 504, 9 N. E. (2d) 532 (1937);
Giedrewicz v. Donovan, 277 Mass. 563, 17o N. E. 246 (1932); Wolf v. Kenyon, 242
App. Div. 116 (N. Y. 1934); Lasher v. McAdam, 125 Misc. 685, 211 N. Y. Supp. 395
(1925). See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Richmond Guano Co., 297 Fed. 58o,
583 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924); Featherston v. N. & C. Turnpike, 71 Hun 1o9, 111, 24 N. Y.
Supp. 6o3 (1893); Jepson v. International Ry., 8o Misc. 247, 249, 14o N. Y. Supp. 941
(1913); Whitehurst v. Elks, 212 N. C. 97, 192 S. E. 850, 851 (1937); Jenkins v. Atlantic
Coast Line R., 89 S. C. 408, 71 S. E. 1o1o (1911); Vukelic v. Upper Third St. Savings
& Loan Assoc., 222 Wis. 568, 269 N. W. 273 (1936); Cox, Res Judicata; Who Entitled
to Plead (1923) 9 Va. L. Reg. 245, 247; Notes, (1938) 112 A. L. R. 404, 405; (1924) 31
A. L. R. 194; (1902) 54 L. R. A. 649; (1908) 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 677; 15 R. C. L. 1027.
,"Griffin v. Bozeman, 234 Ala. 136, 173 So. 857, 858-9 (1937); Tighe v. Skillings,
297 Mass. 504, 9 N. E. (2d) 532, 534 (1937); Cox, Res Judicata: Who Entitled to Plead
(1923) 9 Va. L. Reg. 245, 247; 30 Am. Jur. 978.
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ception made in such cases is a defensible one. Since the master's liability is completely dependent upon a determination that the acts
of the servant were acts wrongful in law, it would follow that where
the master is exonerated upon a trial on those issues alone, the servant should not be liable on the same issues in a later suit. To reach
this result, however, a significant step is taken. The servant is absolved, not because his guilt is dependent upon the master's guilt, but because it is dependent upon those identical facts and issues which have
been given judicial consideration in the former suit and found to be
legally non-actionable. It is difficult to support this position under
the rationale of the cases making exception to mutuality where one
person's culpability is dependent upon the culpability of another.
Mutuality appears to be actually ignored under the guise of the case
being one of derivative liability. 88
The only remaining successive suit which can arise involving derivative liability is that by which the party secondarily liable has been
sued, has had a judgment taken against him, and in the second action
is suing the party primarily liable on the basis of the liability over.
The ultimate liability rests upon the party primarily liable and it is
his duty, therefore, to defend in the first suit if he knew of that suit.389
Under such circumstances he is the same as, a party to the suit and is
bound by that adjudication.4 0 If, however, the party primarily liable
has not had notice of the suit, he should in no wise be bound by the
prior adjudication since he was not a party to it and should not be
prejudiced thereby.41 Of course, if the party secondarily liable prevailed in the first suit, there is no basis for a liability over.
In the above cases the party to the former suit is said to have had
his "day in court" on those issues and is thus not prejudiced, although
a stranger to the first suit asserts that judgment against him. Under
the general rule of mutuality it might seem that the purpose is not
only that of avoiding undue prejudice to the former party, but also
that of avoiding undue benefit to the stranger. But the latter con331 Freeman, Judgments ( 5 th ed. 1925) § 469.

'Robbins v. Chicago City, 4 Wall. 657, 18 L. ed. 427 (U. S. 1866); City of Richmond v. Davis, 135 Va. 319, 116 S. E. 492 (1923).
'0E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Richmond Guano Co., 297 Fed. 58o (C. C. A.
th,
1924); Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Twiss, 35 Neb. 267, 53 N. W. 76, 37 Am. St. Rep.
4
437 (1892); Hartford Accident Co. v. First Nat. Bk. of Hudson, 281 N. Y. 162, 22 N. E.
(2d) 324, 123 A. L. R. 1149 (1939); Crawford v. Turk, 24 Gratt. 176, 83 Am. Dec. 38o
(Va. 1874); 1 Freeman, Judgments (5 th ed. 1925) § 447.
'"Cox, Res Judicata: Who Entitled to Plead (1923) 9 Va. L. Reg. 245, 249.
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sideration would not be compelling so long as the former party is not
unduly prejudiced. It thus appears that in the derivative liability
cases, the former party is subjected to a greater degree of prejudice unless it can be said that those cases have some quality which justifies the
mutuality relaxation. Such a quality appears to inhere in the fact that
there is greater ease in showing that two people's cases are necessarily
upon the same issues where the fact of derivative liability exists. If
such is the correct explanation, it would seem to follow that where
two people's cases are necessarily upon the same issues and each
participates in a separate suit against a common adversary and the
first prevails in the prior suit, the second could plead an estoppel irrespective of a derivative liability connection.
Many, though not all, such cases involve joint tort-feasorship. The
orthodox statement is that an adjudication in favor of one joint tortfeasor is not a bar to a suit against the other.42 It is based upon the
thought that even though the tort-feasors participated in one act of
wrong and the issues of liability are the same for either, it is the separate wrong of each upon which the judgment rests, 43 and that any other
result would violate the principle of mutuality. The question still remains, however, when the identical issues are given judicial considerain one suit, should not an adjudication operate against a party to that
suit when he presents the same facts as the basis of a claim against
another person in a later suit, irrespective of the mutuality requirement?4
All cases involving a third person's use of estoppel by record as
against a party to a former suit can be divided into two general catagories: first, where the winner of the prior suit is later either suing or
being sued, and is asserting the estoppel against a stranger to the
former suit; and second, where the loser of the first suit is suing or
being sued in a later action, and is met by a plea of estoppel asserted
by a stranger to the former suit. The first group may be quickly disposed of. As has been seen, a stranger to a judgment is not bound by it
since he has had no opportunity to try the issues.45 It is with the sec"Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U. S. 111, 32 S. Ct. 641, 56 L. ed. iooq(1912); Lewis v. Ingram, 57 F. (2d) 463 (C. C. A. ioth, 1932); Griffin v. Bozeman, 234

Ala. 136, 173 So. 857, 858 ('937).
' 3 McNamara v. Chapman, 81 N. H. i69, 123 At. 229, 231-2

(1923),

31 A. L. R.

188, 192 (1924).

"The question is posed in Staunton Mut. Tel. Co. v. Buchanan, io8 Va. 8io. 62
S. E. 928 (19o8), but is not answered since issues in the two suits differed. But seeCoca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 Atl. 260, 264 (1934).
OCoca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 Atl. 260, 263 (1934); See Notes
27 and 31, supra.
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-ond group that we are mainly concerned. There are four cases in
which the prior judgment was against a party to the present suit, and
a stranger asserts that judgment as an estoppel against him in the
.second suit:
(i) A formerly losing plaintiff brings another suit against a third
party on the same issues.
(2) A formerly losing defendant brings a suit against a third party
on the same issues.
(3) A formerly losing plaintiff is sued by a third party in a suit involving the same issues.
(4) A formerly losing defendant is sued by a third party in a suit
involving the same issues.
The majority of cases dealing with the derivative liability situation
arises under the first category, and it is apparently here that the greatest
willingness to abolish the mutuality doctrine has been shown, even
where no derivative liability exists. A now-leading authority for this
latter proposition is the Delaware case of Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola
C0o.46 The Coca-Cola Company had brought a suit in equity against
three dealers apparently to prevent their putting Pepsi-Cola into CocaCola bottles. The complaint had been dismissed on the grounds that
the dealers did not do the acts in question. In a second action, the CocaCola Company sued the Pepsi-Cola Company on a claim for a reward
which the latter company had offered to whomever should give infor"
mation leading to the detection of any person who put Pepsi-Cola into
other than Pepsi-Cola bottles. The court, noting that identity of issues
was necessary, and assuming such to be true, held:
"... a plaintiff who deliberately selects his forum and there
unsuccessfully presents his proof, is bound by such adverse judgment in a second suit involving all the identical issues already
decided. The requirements of mutuality must yield to public
policy. To hold otherwise would be to allow repeated litigation
of identical questions, expressly adjudicated, and to allow a litigant havinglost on a question of fact to re-open and re-try all
obtain a new adversary not in
the old issues each time he can
47
privity with his former one."
Although this language restricts the holding of the case to above-listed
situations (i) and (3) where the formerly losing party was a plaintiff
in the first suit, additional language apparently comprehends all four
"Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 At. 26o (1934).
"Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 At. 26o, 263 (1934).
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situations, whereas the facts of the case are limited to situation (i)
48
alone.
In the California case of Duell v. Metro-Gotdwyn Mayer Corp.,4 9 a
plaintiff had sued a defendant in equity to enjoin a breach of contract,
and the controversy had been determined for the defendant on the
ground that no contract existed because the plaintiff had acted fraudulently. The same plaintiff was barred by a plea of estoppel by record
from suing a second defendant for inducing a breach of the same con-tract. A similar holding was made in the Minnesota case of Wilson v..
Erickson5 o where a plaintiff had sued his guardian for an accounting.
on the ground that the guardian sold the plaintiff's property to an
eventual purchaser through several buyers, fraudulently securing tothese buyers a substantial profit. The proceeding had been dismissed
because the charge was not sustained. The intermediate buyers, later
sued by the same plaintiff on the same facts, were allowed to use the
plea of estoppel by record on the issue of the fraud although they werenot parties to the first suit. In Sonnentheil v. Moody51 the plaintiff had
brought a suit against a U. S. marshal for wrongful attachment of
property, and had lost in that suit. In a second action against others forwrongfully inducing the marshal to levy the attachment in question,.
the Texas court allowed the former adjudication as a bar to the second.
suit.
Although it thus appears that the mutuality requirement is.
abandoned where the same plaintiff brings another suit against a thirdi
party on the same issues, a few cases have applied the mutuality rule to,
52
prevent the defendant from raising the prior judgment.
In the second type of case, where a formerly losing defendant sues
a third person on the same issues, it seems that, unless the theory of
mutuality is strictly adhered to, the losing defendant should be barred
from later suing another on issues which have already been decided
against him in a previous suit which he has defended on the merits.5a
The case differs from the first type only in that it is an adjudication
upon a defense, rather than an offense which binds the present plaintiff.
"The rule of the Coca-Cola case has been followed by the federal court sitting
in Delaware. Colen v. Superior Oil Corp., 16 F. Supp. 221 (D. Del. 1936).
'"Duell v. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Corp., 128 Cal. App. 376, 17 P. (2d) 781 (1932).
WXWilson v. Erickson, 152 Minn. 364, 188 N. W. 994 (1922).
1
Sonnentheil v. Moody, 56 S. W. iooi (Tex. Civ. App. igoo).
n=See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111, 32 S. Ct. 641, 56 L. ed.
ioog (1912); Tyrrel v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, iog Vt. 6, 192 Atl.
184 (1937).
"See Note (1938) 112 A. L. R. 404, 405-6.
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A North Carolina case has apparently so held, 54 and in the derivative
liability situations, this change of parties has not been held to affect
the outcome.5 5 Most cases, however, seem to abide by the strict mutuality requirement and deny the right plead an estoppel where no derivative liability exists. An interesting example is the Alabama case of
Interstate Electric Co. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland.56 Here
-the Electric Company, believing that an employee had defrauded it,
-made a report to its bonding company, setting out facts upon which
the alleged fraud was predicated. The employee sued the Electric
,Company for the publication of this report as a libel, and recovered,
the report being found false. In a later suit the Electric Company sued
:the bonding company on the fidelity bond for the losses allegedly
-caused by the fraud of the employee. The bonding company was not
:allowed to plead the former adjudication that the report was false. The
ground for the holding was the mutuality requirement. Again in the
Utah case of Taylor v. Barker57 there was a collision between cars A and
B, whereby both cars were damaged, and a guest in car A received personal injuries. The guest was assigned the claims for property damage by
the owner of car A. In a suit against the owner of car B for the personal
injuries and property damage, the guest recovered on both claims. Later
the owner of car B sued the owner of car A for property damage to car
B. Although the former suit had necessarily decided the issues of negligence and contributory negligence against the owner of car B, no
estoppel was permitted as against him "since- there was nothing to
show an exception to the rule which requires the estoppel of a judgment to be mutual." No privity was held to exist as between assignor
and assignee. 58 A similar holding was made in Vermont in the case of
"Garret v. Kendrick, 201 N. C. 388, i6o S. E. 349 (931). A doctor sued a patient for services rendered and secured judgment. Later the patient sued the doctor
for damages caused by malpractice in performing the services in question. The court
held that the patient was estopped because the defense of malpractice should have
been raised in the first case. The adjudication was also held to be available to prevent the patient from suing another doctor who cooperated in performing the services.
"Blue Valley Creamery Co. v. Cronimus, 270 Ky. 496, 1 0 S. W. <2d) 286 (1937);
Carter v. Public Service Gas Co., ioo N. J. L. 374, x26 At. 456 (1924); Good Health
Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery, 275 N. Y. 14, 9 N. E. (2d) 758 (1937), 112 A. L. R.
401 (1938); Leary v. Virginia-Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank, 215 N. C. 5o, 2 S. E.
(2d) 570 (1939); Vikulic v. Upper Third St. Savings & Loan Assoc., 222 Wis. 568, 269
N. W. 273 (1936).
"Interstate Electric Co. v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 228 Ala. 210,
253 SO. 427 (1934).
' Taylor v. Barker, 70 Utah 534, 262 Pac. 266 (1927), 55 A. L. R. 1032 (1928).
"In cases similar to this one, the former adjudication has been binding since
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Fletcher v. Perry.59 A car owned by Fletcher was involved in an accident with a car owned by Kingsley. Kingsley's car being damaged, he
joined Fletcher and Fletcher's driver in a joint suit for property damage and recovered a judgment, it being found that Fletcher's driver
was negligent. Fletcher later sued the bailee-driver of Kingsley's car
for property damage caused to his car and was met by a plea of estoppel to the effect that he had already lost in a prior suit on the identical
issues necessary to the maintenance of this suit. A demurrer to the plea
was sustained on the grounds of the mutuality requirement.80
The same problem arises where a present plaintiff has been previously convicted of a crime and is asserting claims in a civil action
which are inconsistent with issues formerly decided against him. It is
said to be the weight of authority that a judgment of conviction or
acquittal in a former criminal case cannot be given in evidence in a
purely civil action to establish the truth of the facts on which it was
rendered. 61 The reasons given for this rule are that a criminal case
involves different purposes and procedures, and is controlled by different standards of burden of proof.62 In addition to these reasons, an
acquittal, being beneficial to the party to the prior criminal action,
would be set up against a stranger to the prior suit who would have
had no opportunity to try those issues.6 It appears, however, that the
reasons for the general rule do-not bear weight when the person previously convicted asserts civil rights, in a later action, on issues which
hbave been' formerly decided against him in the criminal action. Thus
privity was found to exist as between assignor and assignee. Goldberg v. Schlessinger,
86 N. Y. Supp. 2og (1904); Godding v. Colorado Springs Livestock Co., 4 Col. App. 14,
34 Pac. 942 (1893); Note (1928) 55 A. L. R. 1o37.
8Fletcher v. Perry, 104 Vt. 229, 158 Ad. 679 (1932).

eOA very similar case is Kessler v. Fligel, 24o App. Div. 232, 269 N. Y. Supp. 664
(1934). Here a president of a corporation accused A of the crime of coercion and A
was prosecuted and discharged. Later the corporation sued A in equity for the same
acts of coercion and A was found guilty. In a third suit, A sued the president for
malicious prosecution and the president was not allowed to take advantage of the
adjudication against A in the prior equity suit. The holding was based on the
mutuality requirement alone.
OStone v. U. S., 167 U. S. 178, 17 S. Ct. 778, 42 L. ed. 127 (1897); Interstate Dry
Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S. E. 301 (1922), 31 A. L. R. 258 (1924);
i Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) § 537; Notes, (1928) 57 A. L. R. 504; (1932) 80
A. L. R. 1145.
62Helvering v. Mitchell, 3o3 U. S. 391, 397, 58 S. Ct. 630, 632 (1938); Note (1924)
31 A. L. R. 261, 264.
&Cottingham v. Weeks, 54 Ga. 275 (1875); Corbley v. Wilson, 71 111. 209, 22 Am.
St. Rep. 98 (1874); Note (1924) 31 A. L. R. 261, 270 et seq.
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64
in the New York case of Schindler v. Royal Insurance Co., under
those circumstances the rule was relaxed to the extent that the criminal
conviction was admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts involved
5
in it, although not as conclusive evidence, or as a bar.6 The Virginia
66
case of Eagle Star & British Dominions Insurance Co. v. Heller extended this relaxation even further by holding a prior conviction conclusive as to the facts adjudicated, irrespective of the mutuality rule,
where one convicted of burning his buildings to defraud was later
suing an insurance company for recover of insurance on those buildings. In spite of the obvious expediency and logic of these latter posi67
tions, both appear to be minority holdings.
Although it can thus be seen that there is a diversity of opinion
as to the mutuality requirement to estoppel by record where the formerly losing party is prosecuting the second suit and sets up issues formerly decided against him in a prior suit, the cases appear to hold, almost without exception, that mutuality is necessary where a formerly
68
losing party is being sued, and the estoppel is set up in offense. Here
the plaintiff in the second suit asks that the formerly losing party be
estopped to set up as defenses, issues formerly decided against him.
Practically all such cases have arisen where the defendant in the second
suit was a defendant in the first, 69 and most involve automobile or railway accidents.

"Schindler v. Royal Insurance Co., 258 N. Y. 3 o, 179 N. E. 711, 8D A. L. R. 1142
(1932).
e3See also Tucker v. Tucker, ioi N. J. Eq. 72, 137 Atl. 404 (1927); N. Y. & Cuba
Mail S. S. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co. of City of New York., 32 F. Supp. 251 (S. D.
N. Y. 1940).

O'Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S. E. 314
(1927), 57 A. L. R. 490 (1928).
,"Girard v. Vt. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 103 Vt. 30, 154 Ad. 666 (1931); Notes (1928)
57 A. L. R. 504, 505; (1932) 8o A. R. L. 1145, 1147. Cf. U. S. v. Carlisi, 32 F. Supp. 479
(E. D. N. Y. 1940). Note that in suits for malicious prosecution, the former acquittal is part of the cause of action, and a former conviction is therefore admissible
as a bar. Turbessi v. Oliver Iron Mining Co., 25o Mich. 110, 229 N. W. 454, 69 A. L.
R. 1o59 (193o); Ward v. Reasor, 98 Va. 399, 36 S. E. 470 (190o).
"Cases indicating a more liberal result are Savage v. McCauley, 302 Mass. 457,
19 N. E. (2d) 695 (1939) where a defendant was prevented from relitigating essential
issues in the same case after a substitution of parties plaintiff against him; and
U. S. v. Wexler, 8 F. (2d) 88o (W. D. Mo. 1925) where a judgment in a former divorce action was held to bind the then defendant on issues later asserted against
him in proceedings brougnt under the Naturalization Law to set aside his certificate
of naturalization. See also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. George Colon & Co., 260 N. Y.
305, 183 N. E. 506 (1932).
"In Macedonia State Bk. v. Graham, 198 Iowa 12, 199 N. W. 248 (1924), 34
A. L. R. 148 (1925), a former plaintiff was a defendant in the second suit and was
there bound by the first suit on issues pertaining to existence of certain negotiable
paper of which he was the maker.
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In Haverhill v. InternationalRy.70 a truck collided with a street car.
The driver of the truck recovered a judgment against the railway
company for personal injuries, the issues necessarily decided being
that the railway company was negligent and that the driver of the
truck was not. Later the truck owner sued the railway company on the
issues of negligence. It was held that the prior judgment, because of
the mutuality rule, did not constitute a basis for recovery by the owner.
It should be noted that this decision was made in spite of the fact that
it was a case of derivative liability. In the Virginia case of Rhine v.
Bond 1 a man, his wife, and three children, riding in their automobile,
were run into by defendant. The man, as administrator, recovered a
judgment against the defendant for the death of one of the children,
the issues necessarily decided being that defendant was negligent and
that the father was not. In later actions for their own personal injuries,
the other occupants of the car asserted the prior judgment against the
defendant as conclusive of the issues of negligence. It was held that the
case fell within the general rule of mutuality, and that the former adjudication could not be utilized. The court said:
"We have not been cited to, and have not found, any case in
which a judgment in an action of tort in favor of a sole plaintiff
injured by the negligence of a defendant has been held to conclude that defendant when sued by another person for personal
injuries received by him at the same time and in the same accident." 2
3
a final adjudiIn the recent New York case of Bisnoff v. Herrman,7
cation in an action commenced by plaintiff's fellow passengers against
defendant for injuries received in an automobile accident with defendant's vehicle was held not to establish the liability of the defendant as
a matter of law where the plaintiff later brought suit for personl injuries received in the same accident. Said the court:

"The holding of the former [Good Health case: derivative
liability case in which the mutuality rule was followed] is that
a prior judgment may constitute a defense, while the determinaof the latter [Haverhill case: derivative liability case in which
1

"Haverhill v. International Ry. Co., 217 App. Div. 521, 217 N. Y. Supp. 522
(1926), aff'd, 244 N. Y. 582, 155 N. E. 905 (1927).
1
7 Rhine v. Bond, 159 Va. 279, 165 S. E. 515 (1932).
-Rhine v. Bond, 159 Va. 279, 284, 165 S. E. 515, 517 (1932). (italics supplied)

The same rule was followed on facts closely similar in the later Virginia case of
Anderson v. Sisson, 170 Va. 178, 196 S. E. 688 (1938).
73

Bisnoff v. Herrman, 260 App. Div. 663, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 719 (1940).
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the mutuality rule was followed] is that 74a recovery may not be
predicatedupon such a priorjudgment."
The court, however, by dictum, went further than the necessities
of the case required, and adopted the completely orthodox view:
"Where as here, there is no privity or relationship approximating privity, a judgment cannot be res judicata, even as a defense, in favor of one who was not a party and who75 would not
have been bound had the judgment been adverse."
Another recent New York decision contains some pertinent suggestions. In Elderv. New York and Pennsylvania Motor Express, Inc.,7 6
there was a collision between two motor trucks, one owned by the U. S.
Trucking Corporation (hereinafter called U. S. Corp.), and the other
owned by the New York and Pennsylvania Motor Express, Inc. (hereinafter call Penn. Corp.). Each corporation sued the other for property
damage to the trucks. The actions were consolidated and a jury verdict
was rendered resulting in judgment for the U. S. Corp. The issues
necessarily decided were that Penn. Corp.'s driver was negligent and
that U. S. Corp.'s driver was not contributorily negligent. A later action
was brought by Elder, the driver of U. S. Corp.'s truck, against Penn.
Corp. for personal injuries received-in the'accident. Elder asked for
whatever benefit he was entitled to from the prior adjudication against
the Penn. Corp. in the previous action. It was held that to allow the
driver to take advantage of the prior adjudication on the issue of Penn.
Corp.'s negligence, and U. S. Corp.'s driver's freedom from negligence,
would "eliminate entirely the requirements of mutuality of estoppel
and of privity ....
overturn fundamental conceptions and overrule
authorities."
Upon a new trial of the same issues, the jury found'precisely contrary to the previous jury finding, and the case was dismissed. The dissenting judge felt that because of the consolidation of the two actions,
the first jury necessarily decided the vital issues against the Penn. Corp.,
and that therefore the truck driver was entitled to an estoppel by record. The dissenting statement, however, is expressly limited to situations where the formerly losing party was a plaintiff in the prior action.
The statement is made that mutuality has not been relaxed where the
7
'Bisnoff v. Herrman, 260 App. Div. 663, 666, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 719 (1940). (italics
supplied)
7

5Bisnoff v. Herrman, 26o App. Div. 663, 666, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 719 (1940). (italics

supplied)
7'Elder v. N. Y. & Penn. Motor Express, Inc., 284 N. Y. 350, 31 N. E. (ad) 188
(1940).
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party against whom estoppel is pleaded is the defendant in both actions; and that ordinarily where such a party was a plaintiff in the
former action and a defendant in the present action, estoppel does not
apply. It can readily be seen that if Penn. Corp. had been a plaintiff in
the former action, and failed to rocover, the failure may have been due
to the contributory negligence of its own driver rather than the lack of
negligence of U. S. Corp.'s driver, in which case the driver of U. S.
Corp.'s truck could not plead the former judgment, since the absence
of his own contributory negligence was not there adjudicated. It is
fundamental in all estoppels by record, however, that the issues concerned in both actions be the same. It appears that the prior action in
which Penn. Corp. lost as a defendant would be the one most apt to
contain issues identical with those in the second suit, since that case
necessarily decided both that Penn. Corp.'s driver was negligent, and
that Elder was not.
The policy of res judicata and estoppel by record would appear to
prompt the abandonment of the mutality requirement where a person
has had one opportunity to prove his case before a court of competent
jurisdiction and has failed. To allow him to assert a position contrary
to the former adjudication merely because his opponent in the second
case is not bound by the first is apparently-an acknowledgment "on the
part of the courts that the first adjudication may have been incorrect.
Such acknowledgment of undependability is out of harmony with the
policy that there be an end to unnecessary litigation. Insofar as judges
and juries are affected by the personal element, and render verdicts
subjectively according to parties, rather than objectively according to merits, fairness to the formerly losing party might prompt the
assumption that the first court was unduly favorable to his opponent.
Also it might be argued that the formerly losing party would have urged his case more strenuously had he known that he would be bound
thereby in later suits by or against third partles.77 Neither argument
is compelling. The first is a rather weak-kneed admission of judical incompetence. The second may explain the greater willingness of the
courts to protect the formerly losing party when he was a defendant in
the first suit, rather than a plaintiff, as noted by the dissenting judge in
the Elder case, and particularly where the formerly losing party is a defendant in both suits. It seems, however, that the party could hardly
claim this protection in derogation of the well-recognized public policy
7Moschizsker, Res Judicata

(1929)

38 Yale L. J. 299, 303.

